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This paper empirically establishes the effect of the employer's term of notice on the wage 
level of employees. The term of notice is defined as the period an employer has to notify 
workers in advance of their up-coming dismissal. The wages paid during this period are an 
important element of firing costs and hence employment protection. To find a causal effect, I 
exploit the exogenous change in the term of notice that resulted from the introduction of a 
new Dutch law in 1999. Strong evidence is found that a longer ‘dormant’ term of notice leads 
to higher wages. In my sample, an additional month of notice increases wages by three 
percent, ceteris paribus. 
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Employment protection legislation (EPL) has been on the (European) po-
litical agenda for several decades and continues to be widely debated. On
the one hand employers complain that they are incapable of adapting to
economic circumstances because of high ¯ring costs and on the other hand
vulnerable groups of employees complain that the ¯ring risk they face is too
large. Policy-makers in the meantime have to decide upon an optimal level
of protection. In order to make such decisions politicians need to know how
di®erent types of employment protection a®ect labor market outcomes. In
order to provide such answers, a large economic literature on employment
protection has developed.
The rationale for installing employment protection legislation is clearly
not to manipulate wages. In practice EPL might however have a considerable
impact on them. In fact, this impact is a central issue in the academic EPL
literature as it is closely related to the e®ect of employment protection on
employment levels1. How these two labor market outcomes are theoretically
related depends on the type of employment protection under investigation,
on the relevant labor market institutions and on which further assumptions
the respective researcher makes. An e±ciency wage theorist such as Lazear
(1990) for example considers a competitive economy with individual wage-
setting and ¯ring costs that will be transferred to dismissed workers. In his
model, wages will adjust downwards to take the ¯ring costs into account and
employment will not be a®ected. Alternatively, Bertola (1990) assumes cen-
tral wage bargaining by a union who cares for incumbent workers only and a
general turnover cost associated to dismissals. According to insider/outsider
theory, employment protection will then bring unions to bargain for higher
than competitive wages. As a result, ¯rms will ¯re (and hire) fewer workers.
Empirically, only anecdotal evidence of the true relationship between em-
ployment protection and wages exists. This is partly because most empirical
research has analyzed macro-data and composite employment protection in-
dices, which introduces comparability issues and confounding factors into
the estimations. This paper seeks to use a micro panel dataset to empiri-
cally establish the causal e®ect of a speci¯c type of employment protection,
namely the employer's term of notice (ToN), on the wage level of employees.
The term of notice is de¯ned here as the amount of time an employer has to
notify an employee in advance of her upcoming dismissal. Speci¯c groups,
notably older workers, are often protected by a longer term of notice. The
term of notice is usually ignored in the empirical employment protection
1In this paper I don't directly discuss the empirical e®ect of employment protection on
employment, as I am currently working on a paper that will deal with the causal relation-
ship between employment protection and lay-o®s. In this forthcoming paper I estimate a
job duration model exploiting the same exogenous change in employment protection as in
the current paper.
2literature. This is unjust as a long term of notice corresponds to a large
number of obligatory wage payments and hence is a substantial ¯ring cost
to the employer.
The Dutch labor market has two relevant features that makes it suitable
as a research ground for this paper. First, for each worker, it is possible
to calculate the `dormant' term of notice that would apply in case the em-
ployer would want to ¯re her. This is because the law sets out a formula
to calculate the term of notice, which generates variation in the degree of
employment protection for workers of di®erent age and tenure. Second, in
1999 the legal formula to calculate the term of notice was changed in The
Netherlands. This paper will exploit this exogenous policy change to answer
the causality question and to separate the age, tenure and term of notice ef-
fects on wages. Low-tenured workers bene¯ted from the introduction of the
law on °exibility and security as their employer's term of notice increased
but higher tenured workers experienced a shorter term of notice after the
1st of January 1999.
The remainder of this paper presents evidence of a strong positive causal
e®ect of the term of notice on wages. It is nevertheless demonstrated that
regressions that ignore the micro-econometric di±culties involved can over-
estimate this e®ect. Section 2 discusses the most important ¯ndings in the
employment protection literature on wages. Section 3 then lays out the term
of notice regulations in The Netherlands and the changes introduced in the
law of °exibility and security (`Flexwet'). The econometric issues that com-
plicate the identi¯cation of a causal e®ect and also the employed ¯xed e®ects
methodology are explained in section 4. The utilized data are discussed in
Section 5 and results will be presented in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature
2.1 Theoretical literature
An extensive theoretical literature looks into the e®ects of employment pro-
tection (i.e. ¯ring costs) on the labor market. Concerning wages, the pre-
dictions of what EPL actually does vary greatly. Many of these di®erences
result from considering di®erent types of employment protection and dif-
ferent types of labor market institutions. I will explain most views in this
section, although I do not pretend to be exhaustive.
Walter Oi published the seminal paper in the employment protection
literature in 1962 as he was the ¯rst to model labor as a quasi-¯xed produc-
tion factor and labor costs as having a ¯xed component related to hiring and
¯ring costs. Many authors followed in his footsteps by building partial equi-
librium models of labor demand, meanwhile introducing di®erent structures
of the labor adjustment costs (e.g. Bentolila and Bertola, 1990). Wages are
however exogenous in the greatest part of this literature. As the e®ect of
3employment protection on employment is important when considering the
e®ect of employment protection on wages, I will however explain Bentolila
and Bertola's argument below.
Whether a pro¯t-maximizing ¯rm decides to ¯re a worker primarily de-
pends on the productivity and wage of the worker2. When the di®erence
between these entities is negative, an employer loses money and she will
consider to ¯re the worker. It is costly however to adjust the number of
employees downward because of ¯ring costs.
Firing costs comprise of two elements: taxes to be paid outside the
job-worker pair and transfers from the ¯rm to the worker (Garibaldi and
Violante, 2005, p.799). Legal costs associated with layo®s fall under the
¯rst type, whereas the term of notice and the severance pay fall under the
second type of employment protection. The length of the term of notice,
or the number of additional wage payments, partly determines the size of
the transfer ¯ring costs. When the gap between an individual's wage and
productivity is large, these costs are substantial. To illustrate the costs as-
sociated with the term of notice, I take a ¯fty year-old female worker from
my sample employed at a ¯rm for twenty years, working for 38 hours a week.
Before 1999, her employer was obliged to notify her 18 weeks before an up-
coming dismissal. If I assume that the ¯red worker was (demotivated and
therefore) completely unproductive over that period, her employer would
have lost on average 26,361 (2005 real) Dutch guilders, which equals 11,962
euros.
Getting back to Bentolila and Bertola's argument: attracting a new em-
ployee in the future will also be costly to the employer because of hiring
and training costs. Hence it could be pro¯table to defer the irreversible
decision to ¯re a worker in order to circumvent adjustment costs. The ¯rm
will indeed do so when either the probability of a productivity change for
the better or the costs of hiring and ¯ring are su±ciently large. According
to the adjustment costs literature, higher ¯ring costs, e.g. a longer term of
notice, thus lower the propensity to ¯re a worker when wages are ¯xed. Note
that the overall impact of employment protection on employment levels is
unclear however, as the propensity to hire also goes down.
As mentioned already, most of the employment demand literature takes
wages to be exogenous. One exception is Bertola (1990) who draws from the
insider-outsider literature (see Lindbeck and Snower, 2001, for an overview
of this literature). In short, insider/outsider theory divides the labor market
into insiders - incumbent workers who bene¯t from employment protection
- and outsiders - those who do not bene¯t such as the unemployed and
temporary workers. Because it is di±cult to get rid of them, insiders have
2This paper considers individual lay-o®s. Individuals can be ¯red because of ¯nancial-
economic or match-speci¯c problems, say when there is a con°ict between the employer
and the employee. Although the latter probably plays a considerable role in observed
lay-o®s, this paper focuses on the ¯nancial ¯ring rationale.
4some bargaining power in the wage process and hence demand higher than
competitive wages (for a formal model, see Lindbeck and Snower, 1986).
In his paper, Bertola looks at how employment protection a®ects wages
under di®erent wage setting institutions. First, he investigates labor demand
and endogenous wages when wage negotiations take place at the individual
level. He ¯nds that under certain assumptions total received wages might
not be a®ected, although outsiders might o®er to work for a very low wage
in order to become an insider and although insiders might afterwards rise
wage demands above the competitive level. This would be because, in a
competitive economy, these two e®ects cancel out. Second, Bertola assesses
wages when there is a wage setting union that cares for everyone in the labor
market. Also in this case, he concludes that lifetime wages would remain
una®ected. Only in the instance of unions who solely represent working
members does employment protection increase total labor income for insid-
ers inde¯nitely.
The idea that a country's wage-setting institutions in°uence the causal
e®ect of employment protection on wages is also exploited in a search and
matching model framework by Garibaldi and Violante (2005). The authors
built a model with endogenous wage setting behavior by a monopolistic
union. Garibaldi and Violante (2005) stress that in such a setting the intro-
duction of an exogenous ¯ring cost has two opposing e®ects on the workers'
desired wage level: workers would like to have a higher wage (the income ef-
fect) but do not enjoy the accompanying higher probability to get ¯red (the
job security e®ect). Whenever the elasticity of the ¯rm's ¯ring probability
to wages is low enough, workers will demand higher wages when they are
better protected.
E±ciency wage theorists shed a di®erent light on ¯ring costs and wages.
Lazear (1990) wrote an in°uential paper on employment protection, arguing
that ¯ring costs do not necessarily a®ect hirings and ¯rings. He reasons that
in a °exible labor market, in the absence of contract and market restrictions,
transfer employment protection such as the term of notice could be undone
by e±cient wage setting behavior between workers and ¯rms. He predicts
that in a competitive economy with decentralized wage setting, ¯ring costs
drive wages down, up to the point where the severance pay and the wages
paid during the term of notice can be seen as a delayed payment.
Lazear's negative e®ect of employment protection on wages is replicated
by Pissarides (2001), but the latter takes the workers point of view. In his
search and matching model the term of notice is endogenous and generates
lower wages because risk averse workers accept a lower income during the
productive period of a job, in order to receive a higher income during unpro-
ductive times. Bertola and Rogerson (1997) adapt a similar reasoning. If
workers are risk-averse and value job security, they will accept lower wages
in exchange for more employment protection.
Because the literature above thinks about workers as having ¯xed or at
5least exogenous productivity, it leaves out another important route through
which employment protection positively a®ects wages. More employment
protection namely enhances the incentives for a ¯rm to invest in a worker
and for a worker to invest in ¯rm-speci¯c human capital. Nickell and Layard
(1999) brie°y describe this e®ect. These human capital investments could
pay o® in terms of higher productivity and higher wages. Arulampalam et
al. (2004) present some indirect empirical evidence that employment pro-
tection does increase training of employees. They ¯nd that those on ¯xed
term contracts take up less training than those on permanent contracts.
To summarize the theoretical insights so far: On the one hand the term
of notice could increase wages. Two main arguments are discussed. First,
insider-outsider theory predicts that employment protection improves in-
siders' bargaining position when there is some degree of centralized wage
bargaining. Second, employment protection could stimulate human capi-
tal investments and hence increase individuals' productivity. On the other
hand, the term of notice could decrease wages. Three arguments are pro-
vided. First, the term of notice, being a transfer component of employment
protection, could be compensated by lower wages in a competitive economy
with individual wage-setting. Second, if the term of notice is endogenous,
workers are willing to accept a lower wage in order to have the job security
associated with a term of notice. Third, employment protection might not
induce workers to increase their wage demands out of fear of the associated
increase in ¯ring probabilities. The latter two arguments hold even in a
more centralized wage-setting environment.
The most appropriate theories for my empirical study are the ones in-
volving some market imperfections and moderate centralized wage-setting.
Lazear's argument is hence not likely to hold in the Dutch economy, in which
employers organizations and a small number of labor unions negotiate over
wages by industry. For more information on wage setting in The Nether-
lands see Wallerstein et al. (1997). Even excluding the e±ciency wage
argument there are however still opposing predictions on the causal e®ect
of employment protection on wages. The data will have to judge which of
these hold.
2.2 Empirical literature
Up to date, the empirical literature has experienced di±culties in estab-
lishing a clear relationship between ¯ring costs and wages. Some of the
papers discussed in the previous subsection do attempt to present empirical
evidence of their models. However, the authors only provide anecdotal evi-
dence of their theory at best, mainly because most of them use macro-data
and aggregate indices of employment protection that are hard to compare.
The estimates are furthermore troubled by confounding factors. Contrary
to what his theoretical model predicts, Bertola (1990) for example presents
6some evidence that the productivity wage gap is actually lower in countries
with stricter employment protection.
The empirical wage setting literature in its turn often ignores employ-
ment protection as it is so hard to quantify. See for example the cross-
country study of industry wage di®erentials by Holmlund and Zetterberg
(1991) and the establishment-level study by Blanch°ower et al. (1990).
Both papers do suggest substantial insider wage gains.
An interesting ¯rm-level study by Autor et al. (2007) does include em-
ployment protection, i.e. tax employment protection , explicitly. The pa-
per exploits U.S. state variation in the adoption of wrongful-discharge pro-
tections in order to study ¯rm-level productivity di®erences. The authors
¯nd that the introduction of these laws coincided with a rise in capital in-
vestment, non-production worker employment and hence measured a labor
productivity increase. Whether these e®ects can be causally linked to the
wrongful-discharge protection remains to be seen. Even so, this study fails
to measure the impact of employment protection on individual workers.
The use of micro-data in the empirical employment protection litera-
ture, which seems to be a necessary prerequisite for identifying causality, is
unfortunately limited. The fact that wages are usually very heterogeneous
across workers of di®erent ages, tenure, education and hierarchy provides
another rationale for individual-level empirical analysis. The only micro-
study on employment protection and wages that I am aware of is written
by Leonardi and Pica (2007). They apply a regression discontinuity design
to study entry wages and the tenure wage pro¯le by exploiting an Italian
policy change. The authors ¯nd no causal e®ect of severance payments on
entry wages. This policy change in employment protection legislation was
targeted at small ¯rms only, which raises questions about the generality of
the conclusions.
My paper is, as far as I know, the ¯rst to identify a strong positive
causal relationship between transfer employment protection and wages us-
ing a representative micro panel dataset. One of the many advantages of
this empirical strategy is that it allows me to control for the e®ect of employ-
ment protection on dismissals. This is because I follow the same individuals
over di®erent years and if applicable over di®erent jobs, so given that a ¯red
worker ¯nds a job again after some time I will observe that person's wage
again.
3 Term of notice
There are two paths to dismissal in The Netherlands, and the legal term of
notice only applies to the labor o±ce path. This is a relatively slow route
that doesn't require severance payments. The labor o±ce has the discretion
to refuse an application, but only does so in a small percent of the cases
7(i.e. ¯ve percent in 2002). Mainly individual lay-o®s in small- and medium
sized ¯rms and collective lay-o®s are dealt with by the labor o±ce, but the
path is open to all employers. The other route, through court, is faster
and involves substantial severance payments3. The cantonal court judge in
principle always allows a lay-o® but adapts the required severance payment
to the speci¯c ¯ring rationale (i.e. a worker receives more if the employer
could have done more to prevent the lay-o®)4.
An employer is free to choose a dismissal path and the labor o±ce path
is thus a credible threat to all workers. Furthermore, nothing changed in the
court procedure over the analyzed period. This means that the employer's
term of notice and the policy changes to it are relevant to all employees on
a permanent contract.
The policy change that will be exploited in the ¯xed e®ects method be-
low is the introduction of the law on °exibility and security (the `Flexwet')
in The Netherlands on January 1st, 1999. This law intended to diminish
di®erences in the labor market between temporary and permanent workers.
On the one hand, employees with temporary contracts received better le-
gal protection than before. On the other hand, employees with permanent
contracts lost some rights. The main change for tenured employees was the
adaptation and simpli¯cation of the legal formula for the term of notice. See
Heerma van Voss (1998) or Smitskam and Kronenburg-Willems (2000) for
a detailed description of the new law.
The calculation of the term of notice before the 1st of January 1999
(old-ToN) was as follows. For every year of tenure an employer had to add
a week to the notice period, with a maximum of thirteen weeks. On top of
this, workers received an extra week of notice for each year they had worked
while being forty-¯ve or older, also with a maximum of thirteen weeks. So,
the employers of two workers with identical tenures (say ¯fteen years) but
di®erent ages (say forty and sixty) faced di®erent terms of notice (in this
case thirteen weeks and twenty-six weeks).
The legal term of notice after the 1st of January 1999 (new-ToN) con-
sists of two elements: a new formula for newly-hired employees and a tran-
sitory arrangement for workers already employed at the introduction of the
`Flexwet'. The new formula that applies to employees hired after the 1st of
January 1999 does not depend on age and accommodates fewer term of no-
tice lengths. For workers employed in between zero and four years employers
3Figure A-1 in the appendix shows the ratio of lay-o®s through the labor o±ce over
the total number of lay-o®s. A constant percentage of about ¯fty percent of lay-o®s are
handled by the labor o±ce. A small increase in the ratio can be seen in 1999, the year
the legal term of notice was changed. It can be argued that the labor o±ce procedure
became more pro¯table that year because the term of notice went down for the majority
of workers.
4In a limited amount of cases a cantonal court judge refuses to end the labor contract,
for example when a sick worker is dismissed because of her illness.
8face a term of notice of one month. When a worker is employed between ¯ve
and nine years, employers have to notify her two months in advance. If a
worker's tenure is between ten and fourteen years, her employer will have to
notify her three months in advance. Any tenure longer than fourteen years
results in an employer term of notice of four months.
The `Flexwet' also includes a transitory arrangement for those workers
that were already employed by the 1st of January 1999. For these employees,
the employer picks the longest term of notice out of the old-ToN calculated
for the tenure and age situation on the 1st of January 1999 and the new-ToN
for the tenure and age at the time of ¯ring.
In addition, for both workers in the new and the transitory scheme, the
new law allows employers to deduct one month of the term of notice if they
have waited to end the labor agreement until after they have received per-
mission from the labor o±ce. The minimum term of notice however is one
month. This subtraction is granted in almost all cases (i.e. ninety-six per-
cent in 2002). In my `dormant' term of notice calculations I assume that
this permission is given in all cases.
The relationship between the old and new term of notice thus depends
on age and tenure of the worker and calendar time. Figure 1 shows the old-
and new-ToN for the respondents in my dataset over tenure and selected
ages. Wherever there are multiple terms of notice visible for an age-tenure
combination this is because of time di®erences, i.e. because the date for
which the term of notice is calculated is closer to or further from the 1st of
January 1999. So, the employers of two workers with identical tenures (say
¯fteen years) and age (say sixty years) but ¯red at di®erent times (say at
the 1st of February 1999 and at the 1st of February 2002) will face di®erent
terms of notice (in this case ¯ve months and four-and-a-half months).
The graphs for the thirty-year and forty-year old worker are identical,
the latter only has a larger domain as no thirty-year old is observed with
a tenure over seventeen years. When comparing the old- and new-ToN for
young workers with a tenure below ¯ve years, the new term of notice is
longer than before. For young workers with a tenure above fourteen years
the old and new term of notice are the same. Young workers with a tenure
in between - from ¯ve to fourteen years - experience a new term of notice
that is shorter than the old-ToN.
The graphs for the ¯fty-year and sixty-year old worker share important
characteristics. For older workers (i.e. from forty-six years onwards) with a
tenure below three years the new term of notice is longer than before. This
threshold is lower for older workers as the old age reward leads to a higher
old term of notice slope5. The term of notice of older workers with a tenure
of three years and over is shortened in the new scheme. The extent of the
di®erence depends on age and tenure of the worker and time.
5For 46 year-old workers the threshold is actually four years of tenure.
9Figure 1: Employer's Term of Notice in old (pre 1999) and new (1999 and
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10Although the length of the term of notice that applies in the labor of-
¯ce path is set out by law, the `Flexwet' made it possible to agree upon a
di®erent term in a collective wage agreement. For the analysis in this paper
it is important to know to what extent this occurred6. Combining infor-
mation from the Ministry of Social A®airs and Employment and my own
calculations7 I ¯nd that after the 1st of January 1999 the legal term of notice
applied to eighty percent of workers. If the deviation from what is written
down in the law is orthogonal to the type of worker in my sample, I can treat
the bias resulting from measurement error as an attenuation bias. This bias
will drive the coe±cient of the term of notice down. Any signi¯cant results
that I ¯nd will hence be underestimating the true causal e®ect of the term
of notice. In the Smits and Samadhan report the distribution of deviations
over sectors seems rather equal. Therefore, and because it is hard to know
which agreement speci¯cally applies to which worker, I abstract from the
deviation in the collective wage agreements and assume that the legal term
of notice applies to everyone.
For longer tenured employees the introduction of the law on °exibility
and security thus resulted in a lower term of notice, but for shorter tenured
workers the term of notice increased. This variation in the direction of the
policy change will prove useful in identifying the causal e®ect of the term of
notice on wages in Section 6.
4 Empirical strategy
In this paper I would like to ¯nd out what is the relationship between the
`dormant' term of notice and wage rates. Merely reporting the association
between the two variables is not enough, I am interested in the causal e®ect
of the term of notice, which is not trivial to identify. Several econometric
di±culties trouble the identi¯cation of a causal e®ect of the term of notice.
All issues arise from the fact that for each employee the term of notice,
at least in The Netherlands, is determined by a ¯xed formula of tenure and
6Smits (2000) and Smits and Samadhan (2002) report that the one month deduction,
with a minimum term of notice of one month, prevailed in practically all agreements
settled after the 1st of January 1999.
7About twenty percent of the workers do not fall under any sort of collective agreement
and hence the legal term of notice will always apply to them. The other eighty percent
of workers do fall under a collective agreement. I checked half of the collective wage
agreements that were declared to hold for all workers in the relevant sector between 1999
and 2002 and found that roughly seventy percent of these featured the term of notice set
out in the `Flexwet'. In sixteen percent of the cases a term of notice calculation that is
related to age and tenure still existed. In fourteen percent of the analyzed collective wage
agreements I found a constant term of notice. If I assume that the distribution of workers
is equal across the di®erent agreements I conclude that eighty percent of workers on a
permanent contract face the legal term of notice after January 1st 1999.
11age.
ToNit = f(Tenureit;Ageit)
Hence, the term of notice is a deterministic, non-linear function of these two
variables. In fact, apart from calendar time (which determines under which
legal framework a worker is ¯red) nothing else in°uences the employer's term
of notice. The analyzed wage model can be seen in equation 1, where X
refers to personal characteristics, Z to employer and job characteristics, "it
to an i.i.d error term and Ài to an individual-speci¯c time-invariant error
term.
Wagesit = h(ToNit(Tenureit(Ài);Ageit);Xit;Zit) + Ài + "it (1)
The ¯rst econometric problem that I encounter is that of the endogeneity
of tenure. Tenure is an endogenous variable, because unobservable charac-
teristics such as work attitude and ability in°uence tenure as well as wages.
As a result of the ¯xed formula that calculates the term of notice from
tenure this endogeneity stains the term of notice variable as well. Running
a regression of wages on the term of notice will thus result in a biased and
inconsistent coe±cient for the term of notice as changes in the term of no-
tice will be associated with changes in the time-invariant individual speci¯c
error term. The endogeneity of tenure and the term of notice can and will
be addressed by applying a ¯xed e®ects type estimator. Section 4 further
explains the applied methodology.
Unfortunately, in the wage model the ¯xed e®ects approach doesn't re-
sult in unbiased estimates of the term of notice coe±cient. An extreme
multi-collinearity problem arises when the important covariates tenure and
age are included in Xit. This econometric problem is another consequence
of the ¯xed formula for the term of notice. The marginal e®ect of the term
of notice on wages can thus never be determined ceteris paribus. This is
because when the term of notice changes from one year to the next this co-
incides with a change in tenure and age. In a traditional regression model, it
is therefore hard to know what is captured in the term of notice coe±cient.
This multi-collinearity can be demonstrated in two ways. First, the pairwise
correlation between tenure and the term of notice in my sample before 1999
(N=10,549) is 0.88. Second, the variance in°ation factor (VIF)8 of the term
of notice in the wage model before 1999 is equal to 10.98.
To nevertheless answer the research question, one can exploit an exoge-
nous change in the term of notice that does not coincide with a change in
tenure and age. To identify a causal relationship between the term of no-
tice and wages this paper therefore exploits the exogenous policy change




) can be used to track down multi-collinearity prob-
lems. R
2
j refers to the multiple correlation coe±cient between variable j and all other
independent variables. A VIF over 10 indicates severe collinearity of higher orders be-
tween the speci¯ed variable and the remaining regressors.
12described in Section 3, the introduction of the law on °exibility and secu-
rity in The Netherlands. It is not necessary to apply any speci¯c type of
policy evaluation method however. The ¯xed e®ects OLS regressions will
`automatically' take into account the exogenous variation in the term of no-
tice as the before and after term of notice calculations are included in the
individual means.
The 1999 policy change has certain traits that are econometrically useful.
First, the introduction of the new law has di®erential e®ects across individ-
uals; this makes it possible to separate time and treatment e®ects. Section
3 explains that the new law increased the term of notice for low-tenured
individuals and decreased the term of notice for high-tenured individuals.
Second, selection into a particular treatment group (i.e. into what ef-
fect the policy change has on one's term of notice) can fully be controlled
for, as the impact of the policy change depends only on age and tenure.
By controlling for these two entities and by removing the individual unob-
served heterogeneity term the potential selection issues can be overcome.
Note that I assume that selection into low or high tenure does not depend
on the potential, individual impact of the policy change. This makes sense
as I believe it impossible that people quit and start a new job, just for the
sake of bene¯ting from a policy change in the term of notice. It should
be remembered that high tenured individuals experience a higher level of
employment protection in general, although the policy change does lower it
somewhat. It would therefore be irrational to wilfully exchange this better
protection for an improving, but still worse protection.
Third, as selection into the treatment depends on observable character-
istics only, I can even control for di®erential wage trends for the groups who
are a®ected by the policy change in a di®erent way. Economic circumstances
and other policy changes could for example have a di®erential impact on the
wage trends for low- and high tenured individuals over the analyzed period.
By adding interaction terms between the period after the policy change and
a dummy for tenure over two years and a dummy for age over 45 I control
for the di®erent time trends (Note that these thresholds are important for
the e®ect of the policy change). In table 1 in Section 6 I show that the wage
trends for these groups are indeed very di®erent.
The causal e®ect I'm interested in can thus be obtained as the marginal
e®ect of the term of notice variable in a regression of wages on the term of
notice, tenure, age groups, time dummies, a dummy for tenure above two
years, a dummy for age over 45, the interactions described above and sev-
eral covariates. In order to do so, equation 2 is estimated as a ¯xed e®ects
linear regression model using the log of the real gross hourly wage rate as
the dependent variable. In this equation xit refers to all other controls and
covariates.
Wagesit = ® + ¯ToN ¤ ToNit + ¯2 ¤ tenureit + x
0
it° + Ài + "it (2)
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5 Data
Six waves of the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel (SEP), a household survey,
are used for the empirical analysis of the research question (1996-2001). This
longitudinal dataset has been collected annually by Statistics Netherlands
from 1984 to 2002. The SEP has been collected every April. Although the
same individuals are observed multiple times in my sample, I do not have
a balanced panel. I observe 57 percent of the individuals both before and
after the policy change, 19 percent only before and 23 percent only after.
I use all available waves before and after the 1999 policy change that
contained information on the type of contract a worker was on and that
contained comparable wage information. Only employees with a permanent
contract are included in the sample. This is because only for tenured work-
ers employers face a legal term of notice.
The dependent variable in the wage regressions is the logarithm of the
real gross hourly wage rate. Net wages are not directly observed. Over the
analyzed period there were no substantial changes to the income tax legis-
lation. I use the consumer price index published by Statistics Netherlands
to compute real wages (base year is 2005). All observations below the 0.1th
percentile (°. 1.26) and above the 99.9th percentile (°. 296.79) are dropped,
because wage rates in these areas seem highly unlikely. Figure 2 shows a
kernel density estimation of the cleaned variable, which is symmetrically
distributed. The average wage rate is 35.36 (2005 real) guilders per hour
(s.d. 16.67). Those with a tenure above two years earn more on average
(°. 37.17, s.d. 15.85) than those who are new to their employer (°. 30.35,
s.d. 17.85). As expected, those over 45 earn more on average (°. 40.55, s.d.
19.13) than their younger counterparts (°. 33.22, s.d. 15.04).
Figure 3 provides distributional information on the terms of notice in my
sample before and after the policy change. Before 1999 the average term of
notice was 2.0 months (s.d. 1.5), whereas it was 1.8 months (s.d. 1.1) after
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the introduction of the `Flexwet'. It can be seen in the graph that the new
law increased the minimum term and decreased the maximum term. The
visible spikes at three months in the ¯rst panel and at two months in the
second panel result from the 13 weeks maximum term of notice in the old
calculation for those under 45.
Figures A-2 and A-3 in the appendix show histograms of the ages and
tenures of the workers in my sample. The average age is 39.5 years (s.d.
9.7) and the average tenure is 9.9 years (s.d. 8.9). The descriptive statistics
of these and other independent variables can be found in table A-1 in the
appendix.
The regressions presented in the next section include various control vari-
ables such as hours worked, dummies for the years 1997 to 2001, a dummy
for tenure over two years and a dummy for age over 45. The lagged wage
rate is not included as it doesn't explain a signi¯cant proportion of current
wages (in my preferred model: coef. .0125, s.e. .0067).
6 Results
Table 1 presents the results of the empirical analysis. All three speci¯ca-
tions include observations of before and after the 1999 policy change. Hence,
multi-collinearity problems can no longer bother the estimates. The ¯rst col-
umn shows the `true', unbiased causal e®ect of the term of notice on wages.
The other two columns contain biased coe±cients.
My preferred model, in column one, exhibits a highly signi¯cant term
of notice coe±cient of 0.0314. This means that for each additional month of
15Table 1: Coe±cients and standard errors of wage models. Dependent: log
of hourly wage rate.
(1) (2) (3)
Preferred Biased Biased
Term of notice 0.0314¤¤¤ 0.0722¤¤¤ 0.0428¤¤¤
(months) (0.00695) (0.00495) (0.0101)
Tenure (years) -0.00312¤¤ -0.00873¤¤¤ 0.00275¤
(0.00103) (0.000777) (0.00123)
Dummy for tenure 0.0596¤¤¤ 0.0148¤ 0.0429¤¤
over two years (0.00835) (0.00618) (0.0149)
Interaction of -0.0852¤¤¤ 0.0128
tenure > two years and after 1998 (0.0109) (0.0182)
Dummy for age over -0.00614 -0.0328¤¤¤ -0.0283
45 years (0.0117) (0.00978) (0.0165)
Interaction of age -0.0318¤¤¤ 0.0359¤¤
over 45 years and after 1998 (0.00908) (0.0137)
Method FE OLS FE OLS OLS
N 21,080 21,080 21,080
Individuals 5,977 5,977 5,977
Aic -17728.7 -17635.9 18798.2
Endogeneity Corrected Corrected Present
Rho 0.892 0.891 -
Di®erent timetrend Corrected Present Corrected
Standard errors in parentheses
¤ p < 0:05,
¤¤ p < 0:01,
¤¤¤ p < 0:001
The regressions include a constant, hours worked, year dummies and eight ¯ve-year
age brackets.
16a term of notice the hourly wage rate of a worker goes up by three percent,
ceteris paribus. Furthermore I ¯nd a negative e®ect of tenure on wages when
I control for all time-invariant individual characteristics. This ¯nding, al-
though contrary to ¯rst expectations, replicates those by other authors such
as Altonji and Shakotko (1987). In the ¯rst column I have also included
a dummy for having tenure over two years and a dummy for being older
than 45 and the interactions between the policy change period and these
dummies. These thresholds were chosen because all workers with a tenure
below 3 years experienced a higher term of notice after the policy change
and all workers above 45 years with a tenure above two years experienced a
lower term of notice.
The estimates show that the wage pay-o® for being higher tenured apart
from the already described tenure e®ect changed substantially from the be-
fore 1999 to the after 1-1-1999 period. Before 1999, once an individual
crossed the two year tenure line his wages went up substantially, i.e. by six
percent. However, in the period after the policy change those with a tenure
above two years faced 2.5 percent lower wages. A similar structural change
a®ected older workers. Only after 1-1-1999, the fact that a worker was older
than 45 had a signi¯cant negative impact of three percent on wages, given
the other age e®ects. Apparently, the economic circumstances and other
policy changes that coincided with the introduction of the law on °exibil-
ity and security were such that these lowered the relative wages of higher
tenured and older workers. As the 1999 policy change in the term of notice
a®ected these groups negatively as well, ignoring the di®erential wage trends
overestimates the e®ect of the term of notice on wages.
In both biased regressions I also ¯nd a highly signi¯cant positive e®ect of
the term of notice on wages. The estimates in the second column are biased
because I ignore the fact that wage trends have been di®erent for low and
high tenured and young and older workers over time. The results in column
two suggest that an additional legal month of notice increases the wage rate,
ceteris paribus, by 7.2 percent, which is a substantial overestimation of the
causal impact of the term of notice.
In the third column coe±cients and standard errors are presented for a
pooled OLS regression9 and the regression estimates therefore su®er from
an endogeneity problem. The e®ect of the term of notice on wages is 4.3
percent in this speci¯cation and hence larger than in the preferred model.
There thus seems to be positive selection into high tenure; i.e. those whose
are more inclined to have a high wage and also more inclined to have a high
tenure. The time-invariant error term that is correlated with tenure will
then drive the term of notice coe±cient up. Not controlling for the endo-
geneity of tenure can hence overestimate the e®ect of the term of notice on
9The standard errors in the presented pooled OLS regressions are calculated using a
cluster-robust variance matrix.
17wages.
Focusing on the unbiased results in the ¯rst column of table 1 a clear
positive empirical relationship between the term of notice and the wage level
is emerging. The marginal e®ect of an additional month of an employer's
notice equals 3.1 percent of the wage rate and is highly signi¯cant at the one
percent level. For the already described female worker in my sample, aged
50 with 20 years of tenure, who experienced a drop in term of notice from 3.4
months to 2.4 months because of the 1999 policy change, this equals a loss
in wage rate of three percent. On a yearly basis this woman, who worked
38 hours a week and earned 38.54 real guilders an hour in 1998, therefore
lost 2,285 guilders (i.e. 1,036 euros) because of the change to her employer's
term of notice.
Where theory is ambiguous on the sign of the association between the
term of notice and wages, my data leaves no doubt. A higher term of notice
causally drives wages up, in contrast to the empirical ¯ndings of for example
Leonardi and Pica (2007). Consequently, a lower term of notice drives wages
down.
To check the robustness of these results several additional models were
estimated which estimates are displayed in table A-2 in the appendix. All
three columns present estimates of models which are similar to the preferred
model in table 1. In the model in the ¯rst column however, the observations
between April 1998 and March 1999 are excluded. This was done to ensure
that the causal e®ect of the term of notice on wages is not the result of
wage setting behavior anticipating the January 1999 policy change10. As
the marginal e®ect of the term of notice in the ¯rst column is even larger
than the previously mentioned 3.1 percent, I conclude that this is not the
case. In column two and three I separate the sample in male and female
workers. Comparing the marginal e®ects of the term of notice for these two
groups, I conclude that the term of notice has an equal size impact on wages
of both men and women. Not displayed in table A-2, but still reassuring
are the estimates of a model where I exclude the individuals who are only
observed at one side of the policy change. The estimated term of notice
coe±cient namely equals 3.1 as well (N=16,683).
I thus ¯nd evidence that the employer's term of notice has a strong
positive causal e®ect on wages. However, the e®ect of the term of notice
is overestimated when the econometric issues involved are neglected. Nev-
ertheless, a three percent higher wage rate for each additional month of
notice is a relevant and substantial side-e®ect of this type of employment
protection.
10Although I do not ¯nd such anticipation, note that such behavior would not contradict
but rather emphasize a causal e®ect of the term of notice.
187 Conclusion
This paper establishes the causal e®ect of the employer's term of notice
on the wage level of employees. The legal term of notice is de¯ned as the
amount of time a ¯rm is required to notify a worker in advance of her up-
coming dismissal. As such, the term of notice is an important component
of ¯ring costs and thus of employment protection.
In order to ¯nd a causal link, I performed a ¯xed e®ects estimation ex-
ploiting an exogenous policy change in the term of notice. This procedure
corrects for the endogeneity of tenure and for the extreme multi-collinearity
between age, tenure and the term of notice. The latter problem arises be-
cause age and tenure are the only inputs in the legal formula that calculates
the term of notice. The relevant policy change is the 1999 introduction of
the law on °exibility and security (`Flexwet') in the Netherlands. This law
altered the calculation of the legal term of notice such that the term of notice
of low tenured individuals went up and the term of notice of high tenured
individuals went down. Six waves of the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel (SEP)
were used for the empirical analysis (1996-2001) in which a ¯xed e®ects lin-
ear regression model is estimated using the logarithm of real gross hourly
wages.
The unbiased econometric model in column one of table 1 unveils a very
signi¯cant, positive causal e®ect of the `dormant' term of notice on the wage
rate. An increase in the term of notice of one month leads to a three per-
cent higher hourly wage rate. One thing is thus for certain; the arguments
presented in Section 2 describing a negative e®ect of employment protection
on wages are incorrect in the analyzed context. This was to be expected for
Lazear's (1990) e±ciency wage argument as the Dutch labor market insti-
tutions do not resemble his competitive model with individual wage-setting.
The same could be said for Pissarides' (2001) argument about an endoge-
nous term of notice as the term of notice is decided upon by policy-makers.
The theoretical literature provides two plausible reasons for a positive
e®ect of employment protection on wages. First, insider/ outsider theory
suggests that the bargaining position of insiders is enhanced by better pro-
tection when unions only represent incumbent workers. In wage negotiations
this could then drive wages up. Second, employment protection creates more
incentives for ¯rms to invest in workers and for workers to invest in ¯rm-
speci¯c human capital. These investments will then lead to higher produc-
tivity and higher wages.
More empirical research has to be conducted to decide which of these
positive e®ect theories is best describing reality. In my empirical strategy,
I cannot distinguish between the two. To do so, more detailed information
on individual employees will be needed. Longitudinal micro-data re°ecting
individual productivity could address the issue directly. As this data is di±-
cult to obtain, a panel of ¯rm educational investments in their workers could
19be analyzed to indirectly ¯nd an answer.
For policy recommendations it is crucial to know what e®ect on wages
is more important: the bargaining or the investment e®ect. If the wage
bargaining argument is stronger, employment protection creates rents for
incumbent employees which policy-makers will want to avoid. If however
the investment argument holds, employment protection improves the qual-
ity of labor which is what policy-makers are seeking. In any case, policy
makers should be aware of the positive side-e®ect of the term of notice on
wages. Just thinking about various types of employment protection in terms
of employment does not cover their full economic in°uence.
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22Table A-1: Descriptive statistics of all variables (N=21,080)
Mean S.d. Min Max
Log gross wage rate (per hour) 3.473 0.434 0.237 5.693
Term of notice (months) 1.945 1.315 0.231 6.000
Tenure (years) 9.934 8.936 1 43
Dummy for tenure over two years 0.734 0.442 0 1
Interaction of tenure over two years
and introduction new law 0.348 0.476 0 1
Age 16-24 Omitted category
Age 25-29 0.121 0.326 0 1
Age 30-34 0.155 0.362 0 1
Age 35-39 0.170 0.375 0 1
Age 40-44 0.175 0.380 0 1
Age 45-49 0.149 0.357 0 1
Age 50-54 0.109 0.312 0 1
Age 55-59 0.057 0.231 0 1
Age 60-64 0.009 0.094 0 1
Dummy for age over 45 years 0.291 0.454 0 1
Interaction of age over 45 years
and introduction new law 0.156 0.363 0 1
Hours worked (per week) 36.071 10.539 1 89
Dummy 1995 Omitted category
Dummy 1996 0.165 0.371 0 1
Dummy 1997 0.170 0.376 0 1
Dummy 1998 0.165 0.371 0 1
Dummy 1999 0.165 0.372 0 1
Dummy 2000 0.166 0.372 0 1
Dummy 2001 0.168 0.374 0 1
23Table A-2: Coe±cients and standard errors of wage models - sensitivity
analysis. Dependent: log of hourly wage rate.
(1) (2) (3)
Biased Biased Biased
Term of notice 0.0375¤¤¤ 0.0298¤¤¤ 0.0311¤
(months) (0.00809) (0.00780) (0.0130)
Tenure (years) -0.00366¤¤ -0.00254¤ -0.00387
(0.00120) (0.00109) (0.00214)
Dummy for tenure 0.0550¤¤¤ 0.0544¤¤¤ 0.0688¤¤¤
over two years (0.00914) (0.00952) (0.0151)
Interaction of -0.0792¤¤¤ -0.0677¤¤¤ -0.108¤¤¤
tenure > two years and after 1998 (0.0131) (0.0122) (0.0203)
Dummy for age over -0.00975 -0.00586 -0.00782
45 years (0.0133) (0.0127) (0.0227)
Interaction of age -0.0355¤¤ -0.0445¤¤¤ -0.0116
over 45 years and after 1998 (0.0118) (0.00994) (0.0176)
Method FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS
N 17,593 12,600 8,480
Individuals 5,862 3,387 2,590
Aic -15638.6 -13954.1 -4675.2
Period Excl. 1999 All All
Sample All Men Women
Rho 0.883 0.903 0.840
Standard errors in parentheses
¤ p < 0:05,
¤¤ p < 0:01,
¤¤¤ p < 0:001
The regressions include a constant, hours worked, year dummies and eight ¯ve-year
age brackets.
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